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Abstract This article focuses on how people infer the justness of events they
encounter. Earlier justice research typically asked participants explicitly for their
justice judgments. More recent research provided evidence for the possibility of
spontaneous judgment inferences. The present research extends this study in three
important ways: it provides strong evidence that (1) spontaneous social justice
inferences can occur in multiple research paradigms, (2) these inferences constitute
a process separate from spontaneous general evaluation of valence, and (3) spon-
taneous justice inferences covary with individual differences in sensitivity to justice.
We provide evidence for these three conclusions by means of important implicit
measurement research paradigms that we specifically tailored to study justice
inferences: the probe recognition paradigm and the grid-relearning paradigm. We
discuss the implications of our findings for both the literatures on justice and
spontaneous inferences.
Keywords Social justice  Spontaneous activation  Inferences  Judgments 
Probe recognition  Grid relearning
Social justice represents a core issue in society, politics, organizations, intimate
relationships—indeed in almost every social situation in which people interact with
each other (Folger, 1984). Study in various scientific disciplines (ranging from
economics to ethology; see, e.g., Beauchamp, 2001) suggests that in their day-to-day
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lives people are exposed to justice-related issues repeatedly. Because all these
encounters inherently demand that people assess the justice of what was going on
(as justice is not an innate property of a situation but rather in the eye of the
beholder; Mikula & Wenzel, 2000), assessing what is just and unjust may be
assumed crucial and frequent human activities. Indeed, recent research provides
preliminary evidence that individuals spontaneously judge the justness or unjustness
of events that they encounter (Ham & Van den Bos, 2008; see also, Correia, Vala, &
Aguitar, 2007; Hafer, 2000; Kay & Jost, 2003). That is, there is some tentative
evidence suggesting that people can draw social justice inferences without having
the intention to form an impression of whether the event that happened was just or
unjust (for a more extensive introduction to the concept of spontaneous inferences,
see Uleman, 1999; Uleman, Adil Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008).
We think it is important to build and extend on these research studies indicating
that people can infer justice levels of situations spontaneously because more
systematic evidence for the spontaneous qualities of the justice judgment process is
needed. Part of why we think more systematic evidence is needed is conceptual.
That is, earlier studies have disputed that individuals consider the justice
implications of events spontaneously (see, e.g., Jasso, 1999; Sabbagh, Dar, &
Resh, 1994). Related to this, well-known moral psychologists have stated explicitly
that assessing morality is caused primarily by careful, intentional reasoning
processes (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1975; Turiel, 1983) whereas others assume,
yet do not show, that assessing morality ‘‘is generally the result of quick, automatic
evaluations (intuitions)’’ (Haidt, 2001, p. 814).
Another reason why we argue more systematic evidence for spontaneous justice
inferences is needed is empirical. For example, most earlier justice studies did not
assess the spontaneity of people’s judgments of the justness or unjustness of events
and did not use spontaneous justice judgments as their main dependent variables. That
is, almost all studies reported in the literature explicitly asked participants or
respondents to form justice judgments using explicit measures like Likert-type rating
scales to assess justice ratings (for an overview, see, e.g., the appendix in Lind &
Tyler, 1988; see also Colquitt & Shaw, 2005). By definition, these kinds of judgments
are intentional (Uleman, 1999) and therefore spontaneously formed justice judgments
have largely not been assessed (notwithstanding that they may have been activated).
There have been earlier articles that, although they did not directly assess the
spontaneity of justice judgments, have argued that after many social experiences
people may have justice on their minds (see, e.g., Greenberg, 1986, see also, Lerner
& Goldberg, 1999). Also, further support for our argument for spontaneous justice
judgments can be found in recent studies that suggest that spontaneous activation of
justice-related knowledge indeed may occur (Correia et al., 2007; Hafer, 2000; Kay
& Jost, 2003). For example, Hafer (2000) found that participants’ implicit reactions
to justice-related words were influenced when participants’ beliefs in a just world
were threatened. However, these studies (Correia et al., 2007; Hafer, 2000; Kay &
Jost, 2003) do not provide direct evidence for spontaneous, unintentional activation
of justice-related knowledge: justice judgments may have been intentional in these
studies, but they do assess implicit responses related to the activation of the concept
of justice.
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More recently there has been direct evidence reporting that people may
spontaneously draw inferences about social justice when they encounter events that
may or may not strongly threaten their just-world beliefs (Ham & Van den Bos,
2008). That is, in two studies we investigated the social justice inferences people
draw after reading descriptions that are highly personally relevant (e.g., ‘‘You and
your colleague do the same work. You make 1400 euros a month and your colleague
makes 4100 euros a month’’) versus after reading descriptions of lower personal
relevance (e.g., ‘‘He and his colleague do the same work. He makes 1400 Euros a
month and his colleague makes 4100 Euros a month’’). In both studies, we not only
assessed intentional inferences about social justice (using explicit Likert-type justice
judgment scales), but also assessed spontaneous justice inferences (using an implicit
measurement paradigm: the probe recognition paradigm). Results indicated that
participants drew inferences about justice spontaneously. Furthermore, the personal
relevance manipulation did not affect intentional inferences about social justice, but
did influence spontaneous justice inferences. That is, spontaneous justice inferences
were stronger following the reading of descriptions of high personal relevance than
descriptions of lower personal relevance. Building on this insight we will present
self-relevant descriptions to our participants in the current experiments, noting that
spontaneous justice inferences are possible also using descriptions that are less self-
relevant.
The Current Research
Our 2008 findings were the first direct evidence for spontaneous justice inferences
using an implicit research paradigm that is well-suited to assess spontaneous
inferences (Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996) and provide preliminary
evidence for the idea that people spontaneously draw inferences about social justice
(Ham & Van den Bos, 2008). The present research extends on the earlier research in
three important ways: a first aim of the current research is to provide more robust
evidence that spontaneous social justice inferences can occur, using multiple
research paradigms. That is, we will provide evidence from the probe recognition
paradigm that we used in our earlier research (Ham & Van den Bos, 2008), and from
a new research paradigm as well (the grid-relearning paradigm). Obtaining evidence
from multiple paradigms is important before reliable conclusions about spontaneous
inferences can be drawn (see, e.g., Uleman, 1999).
A second aim of the current research is to provide evidence that spontaneous
social justice inferences constitute a process separate from spontaneous general
evaluation of valence. We think it is necessary to test this prediction, because a
critic might argue that the spontaneity of justice inferences simply constitutes a
process of merely evaluating the positivity or negativity of events as opposed to
more specific spontaneous evaluation of justice inferences. Thus, it is important to
show a difference in spontaneous justice inferences as compared to spontaneous
valence evaluation (Fazio, 2001). The second aim of this article, therefore, is to test
the specificity of the spontaneity of justice inferences versus more general
spontaneous valence evaluation.
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A third aim is to show that spontaneous justice inferences can covary with
individual differences in sensitivity to justice. Research suggests that people differ
in the strength with which they react to just and unjust events. These individual
differences can be measured by means of the justice sensitivity scale (JSS)
developed by Schmitt (1996; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005). This
scale consists of three subscales, of which the first subscale (JSSVictim) measures
sensitivity with regard to experiencing injustice towards oneself. The second
subscale (JSSPerpetrator) measures sensitivity to profiting oneself from unjust events.
The third subscale (JSSObserver) measures sensitivity to observing that others are
treated unjustly. We argue here that the more sensitive people are to issues of social
justice, the more they will spontaneously draw inferences about social justice. From
a functional perspective, it can very well be stated that functionally it would make
the most sense if people high in sensitivity to issues of social justice would be able
to form adequate justice judgments most spontaneously. Therefore, in line with
earlier findings from the social-cognitive literature that higher mental processes that
occur often tend to become automatized (Smith, 1994; see also Smith & Lerner,
1986), we propose that people who are strongly sensitive to justice issues may have
made justice judgments more frequently, and, thereby, are more likely to draw
spontaneous justice inferences than people who are less strongly sensitive to justice
issues. Earlier research did not test this prediction, and we think it is important to
show evidence for this hypothesis because it will lead to a better view on the
mechanisms leading to spontaneous justice inferences.
Experiment 1
In social cognition research, the automaticity of higher mental processes has been
studied extensively. Findings show, for instance, that after reading the behavior
description ‘‘John gets an A for the test,’’ the trait inference ‘‘smart’’ might be
spontaneously activated (e.g., Ham & Vonk, 2003). In addition to the reasons
mentioned earlier, we think it is interesting to investigate the spontaneity of social
justice inferences because we would like to try to integrate the social cognition and
social justice literatures; domains of social psychology that have been developed in
largely independent ways yet that may profit from each other’s insights. Building on
the literature on spontaneous trait inferences, therefore, we used implicit measures
to find evidence for spontaneous justice inferences. Specifically, we used two
important different implicit measurement paradigms to find evidence for sponta-
neous justice inferences: probe recognition and grid-relearning paradigms (Uleman,
Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). In both the experiments of this article, we presented
participants with descriptions that implied a just event or an unjust event had
happened as well as with descriptions that did not imply anything related to justice.
After this, we measured spontaneous justice inferences using these implicit
measurement paradigms.
In Experiment 1, we assessed participants’ spontaneous justice inferences by
means of the probe recognition paradigm (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). In this
research paradigm, participants read a short description of a situation after which a
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probe word was presented on their screens. Participants were asked to accurately
indicate as quickly as possible whether this probe word was part of the sentence they
read. For example, participants in our experimental trials read the sentence ‘‘You
and your colleague do the same work. You make 1400 Euros a month, and you
colleague 4100 Euros,’’ while on control trials they read a sentence that used the
same words (including identical pronouns to refer to the actor) but which did not
imply anything related to social justice. After such a sentence had been presented,
the word ‘‘just’’ was presented on participants’ computer screen and participants
were asked to indicate whether this probe word was part of the sentence they had
read. If justice inferences are spontaneously drawn while reading the experimental
description, then we should find that participants need more time to respond and/or
more often respond incorrectly on experimental trials as compared to control trials
(the probe recognition effect). This is because the spontaneous justice inference
might have interfered with correctly and quickly rejecting the probe word after
reading a description that did imply that probe word more so than after reading a
description that did not (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). Therefore, finding the probe
recognition effect indicates that participants spontaneously drew justice inferences.
Additionally, in the probe recognition paradigm, participants must suppress drawing
spontaneous inferences to respond quickly and correctly as instructed. Therefore,
this paradigm provides strong evidence that inferring the probe concepts is not only
unintended but also difficult to control (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986).
What makes the probe recognition paradigm especially suited to study
spontaneous justice inferences is that, by its very nature, it pits ostensible task
demands against spontaneous inferences (Uleman, Hon, et al., 1996). That is, to
respond quickly and correctly as instructed, participants must suppress drawing
inferences about social justice. Thereby, this paradigm provides strong evidence that
a justice inference was formed without intentions to do so, and in efficient, and,
especially, uncontrolled ways (see Bargh, 1994). Additionally, characteristics of the
probe recognition paradigm are such that awareness of the formation of a justice
inference is avoided (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986; Uleman, Newman, et al., 1996).
That is, one of the important characteristics of the probe recognition paradigm is
that of all the descriptions presented to participants in this paradigm, justice-related
descriptions need only be a small minority. More specifically, our participants are
only presented justice-related descriptions on 4 of all 60 descriptions, and awareness
of the formation of a justice inference is thereby hidden between interpreting an
abundance of other (filler) descriptions. In sum, the probe recognition paradigm can
provide strong evidence that spontaneous justice inferences can be formed during
reading of situation descriptions that portray a just or an unjust event.
More specifically, the probe recognition paradigm uses short description as
stimulus material to guarantee implicit measurement and spontaneity of cognitive
activity (see McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). Therefore, we developed and pre-tested
four different, short descriptions of justice-implying situations. Of all four
descriptions, we developed three versions; a just-implying version and an unjust-
implying version (e.g., a description of a just [unjust] event was: ‘‘On the first class,
the professor states that 2 [1] of 2 assignments must be handed in. After the course,
both assignments are used to calculate your grade’’); and a control version. All three
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versions used identical words. The just-implying and the unjust-implying versions
solely differed in numbers or amounts mentioned (e.g., ‘‘2’’ or ‘‘1’’) such that they
either implied just or unjust events. Some of the four experimental descriptions
involved distributive justice, some procedural justice. The control version presented
the words (of either the just-implying or the unjust-implying version) in a different
order such that these control descriptions formed logical sentences that did not
imply anything related to justice (e.g., ‘‘On the first class, the professor states
assignment calculations used in both 2 grades. After the course, the 2 [1]
assignments must be handed in.’’).
All descriptions were self-involving because earlier research (Ham & Van den
Bos, 2008) suggests that highly self-relevant justice-related situation descriptions
cause stronger spontaneous justice inferences than low self-relevant descriptions. A
pretest (Pretest 1, described in Footnote 1) indicated that for all four different
descriptions, the three versions indeed were perceived to be just, unjust, and neutral
on a dimension of unjust to just.1
Our predictions were that we would find effects on the probe recognition
measures indicating that participants draw justice inferences spontaneously when
they read the descriptions that implied just or unjust events. Furthermore, we used
our implicit measurement paradigms also to assess spontaneous evaluations of
general valence, and, thus, to explore the possible differences between spontaneous
justice inferences and spontaneous valence evaluation.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 89 students (25 men and 64 women) at Utrecht University. All
participants were native Dutch speakers. For a participation of 20 min they received
2 Euros (1 Euro equaled approximately $1.20 U.S. at the time the studies in this
paper were conducted). All participants were submitted to a 2 (trial type:
experimental vs. control) 9 2 (description: just-implying vs. unjust-implying) 9
2 (probe type: justice-related vs. valence-related) within participants design.
1 In Pretest 1, 160 participants were asked to evaluate how just (1 = very unjust, 7 = very just), fair
(1 = very unfair, 7 = very fair), appropriate (1 = very inappropriate, 7 = very appropriate), and
justified (1 = very unjustified, 7 = very justified) they thought the events described in the sentences to
be. For each sentence, participant’s answers to these four items were averaged to form a reliable scale of
their justice judgments (for each sentence, alpha [ .84). Results indicated that events described in just-
implying descriptions were indeed judged to be more just (on average, M = 6.3, SD = 1.4) than unjust-
implying descriptions (on average, M = 1.5, SD = 0.9), ps \ .001, for all four descriptions. Also, the
control version of each sentence was judged (M = 4.3, SD = 1.2) to be more just than the unjust-
implying version, ps \ .001, for all four descriptions, and less just than the just-implying descriptions,
ps \ .001, for all four descriptions. Furthermore, an analysis of response times to these questions did not
show a difference in response times influenced by description type, F \ 1. Therefore, Pretest 1 shows
that, as intended, that processing times of the three types of descriptions are comparable.
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Stimulus Materials
In our probe recognition paradigm, participants completed 60 trials in random order.
In each trial, a short description and a single probe word were presented to the
participants. Of the 60 trials, 8 trials (4 experimental and 4 control trials) were the
critical trials that were used to test our hypotheses.
In the 4 experimental trials, each description was succeeded by a probe word that
was implied by the description. Two experimental trials each employed a
description implying just events, whereas the remaining 2 experimental trials each
employed a description implying unjust events. In both these 2 sets of 2
experimental trials, the probe word was a justice-related word in one trial, and a
valence-related word in the other trial.
The 4 control trials were similar to the 4 experimental trials, but used
descriptions that presented the words (of either the just-implying or the unjust-
implying version) in a different order such that these control descriptions formed
logical sentences that did not imply anything related to social justice. All
descriptions are available on request. So, to keep words used in the control
descriptions completely the same as in the experimental descriptions, we used
control descriptions in two versions: either the control description used completely
the same words as the just-implying experimental description or completely the
same words as the unjust-implying experimental description. For the 2 experimental
trials employing a justice-related probe word and the corresponding control trials, 2
probe words were taken randomly from a set of 8 words related to social justice. As
just probe words we used ‘‘just,’’ ‘‘fair,’’ ‘‘justified,’’ and ‘‘appropriate,’’ and as
unjust probe words we used ‘‘unjust,’’ ‘‘unfair,’’ ‘‘unjustified,’’ and ‘‘inappropri-
ate.’’2 Using both just and unjust probe words allowed us to assess differences in
activation levels between these two types of justice-related probes.
For the 2 experimental trials employing a valence-related probe word and the
corresponding control trials, 2 probe words were taken randomly from a set of 4
words related to general valence evaluation. The positive probe words ‘‘positive’’
and ‘‘friendly’’ represented positive evaluation, and the negative probe words
‘‘negative’’ and ‘‘hateful’’. The valence of all probe words was assessed in Pretest
2.3 For all trials, at random a description and a concurring probe were chosen with
this restriction that no 2 trials used the same materials.
2 All stimulus materials presented are the English translations of the Dutch materials we used.
3 In Pretest 2, implicit general valence evaluations of all cue words used in Experiments 1 and 2 were
assessed using a measure of implicit evaluation (the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task or EAST; see De
Houwer, 2003). In the EAST, participants see white words that need to be classified on the basis of
stimulus valence and colored words that need to be classified on the basis of color. One can estimate
participants’ general valence evaluation of a stimulus by presenting that stimulus on the colored trials and
comparing the time needed to give the extrinsically positive response (i.e., the response that has to be
made to positive white words) with the time needed to give an extrinsically negative response (i.e., the
response that has to be made to negative white words). If on the colored trials, the extrinsically positive
response is given more quickly and with fewer errors than the extrinsically negative response, one can
infer that the stimulus presented on those trials is positive. If the reverse is true, then the stimulus is
evaluated negatively.
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In addition to the 8 critical trials, 52 filler trials unrelated to social justice were
included in the experiment for two reasons. First, if all materials were justice-
related, we would not be able to show that it is specifically spontaneity of justice
inferences (as opposed to other, more general inferences) that we are revealing here
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). Second, if all correct responses were to answer ‘‘no,’’
attending to the description would not be necessary to complete the task (McKoon
& Ratcliff, 1986). Therefore, in 30 of the 52 filler trials the probe was a word that
was literally in the description. Filler descriptions and probe words were comparable
in length and sentence structure to the critical descriptions and probe words.
Experimental Procedure
The experiment was run on a computer and started with an explanation of the first
task. The first task was the probe recognition task which started with a practice
round of 12 trials. The practice rounds were the same as the trials of the
experimental task, but materials were unrelated to social justice. Next, the 60 trials
of the main task started. In each trial, first a row of X’s appeared in the middle of the
screen for 1000 ms. Next, the description was displayed for 3000 ms, followed by a
blank screen lasting 500 ms. Again a row of X’s appeared on screen for 500 ms, this
time followed by the probe. During the whole task the words ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’
remained visible on the right and left side of the screen. From the moment the probe
was presented, participants could press the appropriate keys (the ‘‘a’’-key and the
‘‘6’’-key to indicate ‘‘no’’ and ‘‘yes,’’ respectively) to give their answer. The probe
Footnote 3 continued
Specifically, the 40 participants of Pretest 2 completed an EAST that used 4 sets of words: 2 sets of
valence-related words (2 positive and 2 negative) and the justice-related words (2 just-related and 2
unjust-related) of Experiments 1 and 2. Within participants, we manipulated set contents (justice-related
or valence-related words) and set valence (positive or negative). For each set, we calculated an EAST
response time score and an EAST error rate score, identical to De Houwer (2003, Study 2). Positive
EAST scores indicate that the stimulus presented on those trials is evaluated positive, whereas negative
EAST scores indicate negative valence evaluation. We analyzed EAST response time scores and EAST
error rate scores (as De Houwer, 2003) for the 4 sets of cue words in two separate 2 (set contents: justice-
related vs. valence-related) x 2 (set valence: positive vs. negative) repeated measures ANOVA’s. In both
analyses, we found the expected interaction effect; for EAST response time scores, F(1, 39) = 4.85,
p \ .05; for EAST error rate scores, F(1, 39) = 5.00, p \ .05. As expected, inspection of means reveals
that for valence-related cue words differences in EAST scores between positive and negative sets are
bigger than for justice-related cue words. That is, the interaction effect indicated that for EAST response
time scores, valence-related positive set scores (M = 40 ms, SD = 55 ms) differed more from valence-
related negative set scores (M = -37 ms, SD = 51 ms), F(1, 39) = 45.83, p \ .001, g2 = .54, than
justice-related positive set scores (M = 16 ms, SD = 54 ms) differed from justice-related negative set
scores (M = -24 ms, SD = 50 ms), F (1, 39) = 10.25, p \ .01, g2 = .21. Similarly, for EAST error rate
scores the above mentioned interaction effect showed that the difference between valence-related positive
and negative error rate scores (Ms = 1.17% vs. -0.98%, SDs = .95 and .76%) was bigger, F(1,
39) = 104.36, p \ .001, g2 = .73, than the difference between justice-related positive and negative error
rate scores (Ms = .81% vs. -0.73%, SDs = 1.03 and .89%), F(1, 39) = 62.39, p \ .001, g2 = .61.
These findings show that the cue words representing valence evaluation are evaluated more extreme on a
scale of valence than are words representing justice. As intended, this made our valence-related words
better suited for assessing automatic general evaluation than our justice-related words (cf. De Houwer,
2003), because, as expected, these results show that they lead to stronger implicit evaluations.
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remained visible until the participant had pressed one of both keys. After the answer
was given, a blank screen was displayed for 1000 ms. Then, the next trial started.
After completing all trials, participants completed the most recent version of the
justice sensitivity scales (Schmitt et al., 2005). For each subscale, participants had to
indicate on a 7-point Likert scale how much they agreed with 10 different
statements (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). Participants’ answers to each
set of 10 questions were averaged to form three reliable scales of JSSVictim
(alpha = .78), JSSObserver (alpha = .89), and JSSPerpetrator (alpha = .86). An
example of a JSSVictim statement is ‘‘It bothers me when others receive something
that ought to be mine.’’ An example of a JSSObserver statement is ‘‘I am upset when
someone does not get a reward he/she has earned.’’ And an example of a
JSSPerpetrator statement is ‘‘I cannot easily bear to unilaterally profit from others.’’
Finally, participants were thanked, paid for their participation and debriefed.
Results
Response Latencies
All participants had a low error rate (M = 5.7%, ranging from 0 to 11.2%).
Response latencies were analyzed only if the reaction had been a correct one. As
recommended by Ratcliff (1993), we analyzed our response latency data by using
two methods. First, an absolute cutoff criterion of \200 and [2000 ms was used.
Second, an inverse transformation (1/x) of the response latencies was used. The
analyses reported hereafter are based on the cutoff criterion, which yielded
converging results to the inverse transformation analysis. By using the cutoff point
criterion, only a total of 7 responses (0.16%) from 5 participants had to be dropped
from the statistical analyses.
Response latencies were submitted to a 2 (trial type: experimental vs. control) 9
2 (description: just-implying vs. unjust-implying) 9 2 (probe type: justice-related
vs. valence-related) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). We found
corroborative evidence for our research hypotheses. That is, we found evidence for
spontaneous justice inferences, indicated by an interaction between trial type and
probe type, F(1, 83) = 5.67, p \ .05. As predicted, for justice-related probe words,
participants responded slower on experimental trials (M = 699, SD = 174) than on
control trials (M = 639, SD = 204), F(1, 83) = 13.15, p \ .01. For valence-related
probe words, participants did not respond slower on experimental trials than on
control trials (overall M = 651, SD = 215), F \ 1. So, as expected, participants
were slower in rejecting justice-related probe words on experimental trials (after
reading a description that implied just or unjust events) than on a control trials (after
reading a justice-unrelated control description), whereas for valence-related probe
words this effect was weaker, in fact was statistically not significant. Furthermore,
there was no statistical evidence that descriptions implying just events led to
different probe recognition effects than descriptions implying unjust events, as
indicated by a non-significant interaction between trial type and description, F \ 1,
and between trial type, description, and probe type, F \ 1.
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We also examined whether the 4 just probe words led to different probe
recognition effects than the 4 unjust probe words. Because we only allowed for a
minimum number of 2 experimental trials to contain only materials (description and
probe word) related to justice, each participant saw only two of the four possible
combinations of the two types of descriptions (just-implying or unjust-implying)
and the two types of justice-related probe words (just and unjust probe words).
Because of randomization of these combinations, there were two specific subsets of
participants that did see the trials relevant for the current analyses. That is, one
subset saw only just probe words and a sentence implying a just event on the one
and an unjust event on the other of the two experimental trials. Another subset saw
only unjust probe words combined with both a sentence implying a just event and
one implying an unjust event. So, we could perform two separate 2 (trial type:
experimental vs. control) 9 2 (description: just-implying vs. unjust-implying)
repeated measures ANOVAs for the two subsets of participants. Results indicate
probe recognition effects for both types of probe words: For just probe words,
participants responded slower on experimental trials (M = 667, SD = 181) than on
control trials (M = 618, SD = 195), F(1, 20) = 4.44, p \ .05, and for unjust probe
words, this pattern was also found (M = 689, and SD = 134, versus M = 599, and
SD = 168), F(1, 20) = 7.37, p \ .05, independent of whether the sentence implied
just or unjust events, all Fs \ 1.
Likewise, we performed two separate ANOVAs identical to those used to analyze
response times to justice-related probe words, now to explore whether the positive
valence-related probe words led to different response times than negative valence-
related probe words. Results indicate no overall probe recognition effects for both
types of probe words: Neither for positive nor for negative valence-related probe
words did we find a main effect of trial type, both Fs \ 1. However, we did find that
descriptions that implied a just event led to spontaneous activation of positive
valence evaluation. That is, for positive valence-related probe words, we found an
interaction between trial type and description: Simple effect analyses revealed that
when the description implied a just event, participants responded slower to positive
valence-related probe words on experimental trials (M = 739, SD = 263) than on
control trials (M = 635, SD = 177), F(1, 20) = 4.73, p \ .05, but not when then
the description implied an unjust event, F \ 1. For negative valence-related probe-
words, this interaction was not found, F \ 1.
Error rates
Because no selection criteria apply in this analysis, all error rates of the 89
participants could be analyzed in repeated measures ANOVA identical to the one
used to analyze response latencies.4 This analysis showed results comparable to the
analysis of response latencies: The interaction effect between trial type and probe
type was significant, F(1, 88) = 17.98, p \ .001. For justice-related probes,
participants made more errors on experimental trials (M = 6.49%, SD = 0.58%)
4 When analyzing error rates, we will analyze binomial data—i.e., answers were either correct or wrong.
For analyses of variance on binomial data, see Kirk (1982).
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than on control trials (M = 4.04%, SD = 0.57%), F(1, 88) = 33.94, p \ .001. For
probes related to evaluation, this difference in error rates was not found (overall
M = 5.59%, SD = 0.60%), F \ 1. Furthermore, as in the analyses of participants’
response times, there was no evidence that descriptions implying just events led to
different error rates than did descriptions implying unjust events, as suggested by a
non-significant interaction between trial type and description, F \ 1, and between
trial type, description, and probe type, F \ 1.
Finally, comparable to the response time results, further analyses of error rates
for just versus unjust probe words indicated probe recognition effects for both just
as well as unjust probe words. Two separate repeated measures ANOVA’s, identical
to those used to analyze response times of just and unjust probe words, showed that
participants made more errors on experimental trials than on control trials, both for
just-related probe words, F(1, 22) = 6.52, p \ .05, as well as for unjust-related
probe words, F(1, 21) = 8.89, p \ .01, independent of description type, all Fs \ 1.
We also performed identical ANOVAs to assess probe recognition effects on
error rates for positive and negative valence-related probe words. Comparable to
analyses of response times on the two types of valence-related probe words, results
did not show that participants made more errors on experimental trials than on
control trials for positive nor for valence-related probe words. However, different
from analyses on response times to positive valence-related probe words, the
analyses of error rates did not suggest that descriptions that implied a just event led
to activation of spontaneous positive valence evaluation. That is, for positive
evaluation-related probe words, we did not find an interaction between trial type and
description in the analysis of error rates, F(1, 22) = 1.53, p = .23, and a simple
main effect of trial type was not found for descriptions implying a just event nor
descriptions implying an unjust event, Fs \ 1. For negative valence-related probe
words, comparable to the analyses of response times, differences in error rates
between descriptions types were not found, F \ 1.
Insights from Differences in Justice Sensitivity
An additional, intriguing aspect of the current findings is that they suggest that
spontaneous justice inferences and individual differences in justice sensitivity may
be correlated. Specifically, we analyzed whether participants’ scores on the three
subscales of the justice sensitivity scale (JSS) were related to the spontaneous
activation of the justice-related probe words. To this end, we constructed a measure
representing the spontaneous activation of justice-related probe words by subtract-
ing participants’ response times on control trials from their response times on
experimental trials (collapsing across just-implying and unjust-implying descrip-
tions). A regression analysis on this measure for spontaneous justice inferences,
showed that of the three subscales of the JSS (JSSVictim, JSSObserver, JSSPerpetrator),
JSSVictim, Beta = .236, t(85) = 1.96, p \ .05, and JSSPerpetrator, Beta = .238,
t(85) = 2.12, p \ .05, were significantly related to participants’ spontaneous justice
inferences. This suggests that especially individual differences in sensitivity to
experiences of own injustice and sensitivity towards profiting from unfair events
may be strongly associated with spontaneous justice inferences.
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Discussion
In accordance with our expectations, Experiment 1 presents evidence for
spontaneous justice inferences. That is, when participants had read a justice-
implying description and the probe word was justice-related, participants were
slower and made more errors on rejecting the probe. This suggests that a justice
inference was drawn spontaneously while reading our experimental descriptions and
that this spontaneous justice inference interfered with quickly and correctly
rejecting the probe. Because the probe recognition paradigm was designed to
guarantee spontaneity of activation of inferences (see, Uleman, 1999), and hence
not giving participants any intentions or instructions to start forming justice
judgments), the findings of Experiment 1 indicate that people can activate concerns
for social justice in unintended ways when witnessing justice-related events.
The findings of Experiment 1 also indicate that spontaneously drawing an
inference about social justice is not necessarily the same as more general,
spontaneous processes of valence evaluation, as the findings obtained in our probe
recognition paradigm clearly indicated stronger activation by our justice-implying
descriptions for justice-related probe words than for valence-related probe words.
That is, the results indicate only spontaneous justice inferences, but, overall, no
spontaneous activation of valence evaluation. Importantly, the results did suggest
that the probe recognition paradigm we used in Experiment 1 is sensitive to
detecting spontaneous valence evaluation. That is, when our participants had read a
description that implied a just event, participants were slower on rejecting positive
valence-related probe, although they did not make more errors. This suggests that
positive valence has been spontaneously activated while reading those descriptions
as it interfered with quickly rejecting the probe. This indicates that some
spontaneous valence evaluation has occurred. In Experiment 2, we will use another
implicit measurement paradigm to study the robustness of the effects reported in
Experiment 1.
Finally, we also obtained evidence that individual differences in sensitivity to
experiences of own injustice and sensitivity toward profiting from unfair events may
be strongly associated with spontaneous justice inferences. We did not find
differences in activation of just-related from unjust-related concepts dependent on
whether a description implied a just or an unjust event. We will come back to these
findings after we have reported the findings of our second experiment.
Experiment 2
One important aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings obtained in
Experiment 1 using a different research paradigm. To this end, we adapted another
implicit measurement paradigm to detect spontaneous justice inferences: the ‘‘grid-
relearning paradigm.’’ This paradigm was recently developed by Ham and Vonk
(2003) to study the activation of spontaneous inferences in person perception. It is in
general based on the notion that relearning is more effective than learning, and more
specifically on research by Carlston and Skowronski (1994), and on the idea that
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implicit inferences are learned when they initially occur, so that when the same
material is encountered later on in explicit learning trials, it is essentially relearned
and hence learned more quickly.
In the grid-relearning paradigm, we developed for the line of research presented
here, participants had the opportunity to learn a combination two times. That is, in
the three tasks of this paradigm, participants are presented with a 4 9 4
information-grid. In the first task, in each cell of the grid, a description is presented.
For example, one unjust-implying description that we used was: ‘‘You and your
colleague do the same work. You make 1400 euros a month and your colleague
makes 4100 euros a month.’’ This description was presented to the participants in a
certain cell of the 4 9 4 grid and the only instruction participants received was to
read this sentence. In the second task, cue words are presented in each cell and
participants are asked to remember which word was presented in which cell. Finally,
in the third task, recall for which word was presented in which cell is tested.
In some cases (labeled a relearning trial), the cue word presented in the second
task is an implication of the description presented in that same cell in the previous
task. For example, ‘‘unjust’’ is presented in the same cell as where the unjust-
implying description was presented. In such a case, assuming that a justice inference
is already drawn spontaneously while reading the description during the first task
(since no instructions were given to participants to form justice judgments),5 this
implies that participants are now learning a combination they already saw before. In
effect, then, they are relearning the combination. In other cases (labeled control
trials), the cue word presented in the second task is not an implication of the
description presented in that same cell in the first task. For example, ‘‘unjust’’ is
presented in the same cell as where a description that did not imply something
related to justice was presented in the first task. So, in the control trials, relearning
does not occur because a spontaneous justice inference cannot have been drawn
while reading this description.
If a justice inference is drawn spontaneously while reading the justice-implying
description in the first task, recall should be better in relearning trials than in control
trials, because in case of the relearning trial, the first exposure should have produced
a residual effect that facilitates learning in the second task. These facilitation effects
(Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Ham & Vonk, 2003), were used here to study the
possibility of spontaneous justice inferences in Experiment 2.
5 Indeed, not giving instructions to form a justice inference does not necessarily mean that people did not
intentionally form one. However, as the relearning paradigm does give participants another instruction
(namely to read the sentences presented to them), this research paradigm (see also Carlston &
Skowronski, 1994) argues that they were not given the intention to form justice inferences but rather other
intentions, and therefore, that participants (if the relearning effect is found) drew justice inferences
spontaneously, that is, without haven been given the intention. People may spontaneously come up with
the intention to draw justice inferences (instead of doing what we ask them: read the sentences), but in
that case, their intentions would be at least spontaneously formed. Experiment 1 indicates that even when
participants need to suppress drawing spontaneous inferences (to respond quickly and correctly as
instructed) they still do so. Thereby, the research paradigm used in Experiment 1 indicates that even when
something like ‘spontaneous intentions to draw justice inferences’ is inhibited, we find evidence of
spontaneous justice inferences.
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The relearning paradigm is especially suited for our current means because it has
not only been used to assess spontaneous social inferences, but also to assess
spontaneous valence evaluation. That is, in a study by Ho, Skowronski, and Carlston
(D. Carlston, personal communication, November 11, 2005), the relearning
paradigm showed facilitation effects for general valence evaluation terms like
‘‘positive’’ and ‘‘negative,’’ indicating that valence evaluation spontaneously
occurred when participants were presented with positive or negative valence-
implying (behavior) descriptions, and can be detected by relearning paradigms.
Because the experimental descriptions we used in Experiment 2 were specifically
tailored to reflect justice-related issues, we expected participants who have been
presented just-implying and unjust-implying descriptions to show stronger facili-
tation effects for cue words that are related to justice than for cue words related to
general valence evaluation, and exploratively we examined whether facilitation




Ninety-four students (33 men and 61 women) at Utrecht University participated in
this experiment. All participants were native Dutch speakers and received 2 Euros
for their participation of approximately 20 min. Participants were submitted to a 3
(trial type: relearning just-implying description vs. relearning unjust-implying
description vs. control) 9 2 (cue type: justice-related word vs. valence-related word)
within participants design.
Stimulus Materials
In the experiment, each participant completed 16 trials. Ten of these trials were filler
trials and 6 were experimental trials. In each trial, a short description and a single cue
word were presented to the participants. In the 6 experimental trials, each participant
was presented with 2 just-implying descriptions, 2 unjust-implying descriptions, and
2 justice-unrelated descriptions. The descriptions were presented in a randomized
order to participants. The just-implying and unjust-implying descriptions used in
Experiment 2 are identical to those used in Experiment 1. The justice-unrelated
descriptions were 2 general personality-trait-implying descriptions, taken at random
from a set of 12 descriptions used in earlier research using this paradigm (see Ham &
Vonk, 2003, Appendix, Descriptions 1–12). Finally, on the 10 filler trials, the
remaining 10 descriptions from the Ham and Vonk (2003) materials were used.
The cue words used on the experimental trials of Experiment 2 were identical to
the justice-related and valence-related probe words used in Experiment 1. Like the
descriptions, cue words used on the 10 filler trials were identical to those used in
earlier research using this paradigm (see Ham & Vonk, 2003, Appendix, Trait words
1–10). For each experimental trial, at random a description and a cue word were
chosen with this restriction that no two trials used the same materials.
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Overview of the Grid-Relearning Paradigm
The grid-relearning paradigm consisted of three main tasks: an exposure task, a
relearning task, and a cued-recall task. In each task, a grid of 4 9 4 cells was
displayed on participants’ screens. In the exposure task, 16 descriptions were
presented: One by one, in random order and randomly distributed among the cells of
the grid, a description was displayed for 6 s. In the relearning task, a randomly
ordered cue word was displayed for 4 s in one of the cells. Participants were
instructed to memorize which word was displayed in which cell. In half of the
trials—the relearning trials—the cue word fitted an implication of the description
that had been presented in the same cell during the exposure task. In the other half
of the trials—the control trials—the displayed cue word did not fit an implication of
the description presented in the same cell. Thus, these control trials did not allow
relearning. Finally, during the cued-recall task, participants were asked to recall
what cue word was shown in which cell in the relearning task.
So, the grid-relearning paradigm consists of 16 trials, of which 8 were relearning
trials and 8 were control trials. Of all 16 trials, 3 trials (2 of the 8 relearning trials
and 1 of the 8 control trials) were used to detect spontaneous justice inferences and
the other 3 trials (2 of the remaining 6 relearning trials and 1 of the remaining 7
control trials) were used to detect spontaneous evaluation of valence. The design of
the current study only applies to these 6 trials. The remaining 10 trials (4 relearning
trials and 6 control trials) were filler trials that did not use material related to justice.
As in Experiment 1, the filler trials were included mainly to keep the ratio of justice-
related descriptions to justice-unrelated descriptions low. Cue type was manipulated
within the six experimental trials: In 3 trials, the cue word used in the relearning
task was a justice-related word, and in the other 3 trials a valence-related word. Also
within these 6 experimental trials, thus within subjects, trial type was manipulated.
That is, participants completed two relearning trials that used a just-implying
description, two relearning trials that used an unjust-implying description and two
control trials. In the two types of relearning trials, the description was just-implying
in the one type of relearning trials, and the description was unjust-implying in the
other. In control trials, the descriptions in the exposure task did not imply anything
related to just or unjust experiences.
Procedure
Seated behind a computer screen, participants individually went through the
instructions and the tasks. They were told that they would participate in a study
investigating communication. After receiving general instructions, participants
completed a practice trial, consisting of completing a practice exposure task and a
practice cued-recall task (both tasks were unrelated to social justice).
After this, the actual experiment began, starting with the exposure task.
Participants were asked to read all descriptions to be presented in the 4 9 4 grid. In
each cell of the grid, in random order, a description was presented for 6 s. After a
description had been presented, the screen turned blank for 2 s and then the next
description was displayed in another cell.
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Between the exposure and the relearning task, a filler task (consisting of five
word puzzles) was inserted to make it less easy for participants to recall the specific
information presented in each cell (cf. Carlston & Skowronski, 1994). After the
filler task, participants completed the relearning task. Identical to the practice task,
participants were asked to remember what cue word was presented in which cell in
this task. Each cue word was presented for 2 s in a cell of the grid, and then the
screen turned blank for 2 s and the next word was presented in another cell.
Between the relearning and the cued-recall task, a second filler task (consisting of a
different set of five word puzzles) was inserted.
The last task was the cued-recall task. In this task, participants were presented
with the words presented in the relearning task, and asked in which cell that cue
word had been shown during the relearning task. This question was asked about all
16 words, in random order. Every time, the question was presented underneath the
4 9 4 grid, and participants could answer by clicking on a cell with their mouse. So,
the dependent variable indicated whether the participant answered a question correct
or false (coded as ‘‘1’’ for a correct answer and ‘‘2’’ for an incorrect answer on a
specific trial).
After the grid-relearning paradigm, participants completed the justice sensitivity
scales, identical to Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, participants’ answers to each
set of 10 questions were averaged to form the three reliable scales of JSSVictim
(alpha = .81), JSSObserver (alpha = .86), and JSSPerpetrator (alpha = .82). Finally,
participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Results and Discussion
Facilitation Effects
To determine whether we found evidence for spontaneous justice inferences in
Experiment 2, we analyzed whether the justice relearning paradigm we developed
yielded the facilitation effects predicted by our focal hypothesis of Experiment 2.
Therefore, whether participants’ responses to the cued-recall on a trial were correct
or incorrect was submitted to a 3 (trial type: relearning just-implying description vs.
relearning unjust-implying description vs. control) 9 2 (cue type: justice-related
word vs. valence-related word) repeated measures ANOVA (see Footnote 3). A
difference in activation of spontaneous justice inferences as compared to sponta-
neous valence evaluation would be indicated by facilitation effects on justice-related
cue words for relearning trials over control trials. In other words, we expected an
interaction between trial type and cue type such that superior recall would be found
on the relearning trials for justice-related cue words. This interaction effect between
trial type and cue type was indeed found, F(1, 93) = 3.15, p \ .05. As hypothesized,
for justice-related cue words, relearning trials led to better recall of cue words than
the control trials, indicated by a simple effect of trial type, F(1, 93) = 4.26, p \ .05.
That is, a facilitation effect was found for justice-related cue words: Of all
participants, 47.3% remembered the relearning trials correctly, whereas 30.9%
remembered the control trial correctly, indicated by a contrast comparing (the two
types of) relearning trials to control trials, F(1, 93) = 10,03, p \ .001.
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Results of Experiment 2 also mirror those of Experiment 1 by showing that
whether the descriptions implied just or unjust events did not influence facilitation
effects on recall of justice-related cue words: Contrast analyses showed that the
facilitation effect was found both for relearning trials using a just-implying
description (in which case 48.9% of the participants answered correctly) compared
to control trials (30.9% of the participants answered correctly), F(1, 93) = 7.96,
p \ .01, as for relearning trials using an unjust-implying description (45.7% of the
participants answered correctly) compared to control trials, F(1, 93) = 5.72,
p \ .05. A direct comparison of these two effects suggests that just-implying versus
unjust-implying sentences did not lead to better relearning of justice-related cue
words, as indicated by a non-significant contrast effect, F \ 1.
For valence-related cue words, a facilitation effect following the just- or unjust-
implying descriptions was not found: Relearning trials were not remembered better
than control trials for these cue words, F \ 1 (overall, 44.3% of the participants
answered correctly on these trials).6 Also, both the contrast of relearning trials using
a just-implying description versus control trials and the contrast of relearning trials
using an unjust-implying description to control trials were not significant, and also a
contrast comparing (the two types of) relearning trials to control trials was not
significant, all Fs \ 1.
Furthermore, we explored whether the 4 just cue words led to different
facilitation effects than the 4 unjust cue words. Replicating the pattern found in
Experiment 1, results of Experiment 2 indicate a facilitation effect for both types of
cue words: For just cue words, 57.9% of the participants remembered relearning
trials correctly, whereas only 34.2% remembered the control trial correctly, F(1,
37) = 6.13, p \ .05, and for unjust cue words, this pattern was also found
(58.1–24.3% of the participants), F(1, 37) = 11.24, p \ .01, independent of
whether the description implied just or unjust events, Fs \ 1.
We also explored whether the 2 positive valence-related cue words led to
different facilitation effects than the 2 negative valence-related cue words. Although
these analyses in Experiment 1 did reveal some evidence of specific spontaneous
valence-evaluations, results of the current experiment did not indicate facilitation
effects, neither when the probe word was related to positive or negative valence nor
when the description implied a just or an unjust event, Fs \ 1.
Insights from Differences in Justice Sensitivity
Additionally, Experiment 2 corroborates the findings obtained in Experiment 1 in
that spontaneous justice inferences and the same individual differences in justice
sensitivity (JSSVictim, JSSPerpetrator) were again significantly related: As in Exper-
iment 1, we analyzed whether participants’ scores on the justice sensitivity scale
(JSS) subscales were related to a measure we constructed that indicated the strength
of spontaneous activation of justice-related cue words. This indication of the
6 A direct comparison between findings for justice-related cue words and valence-related cue words
cannot be made because these types of cue words consist of different words that can be more easy or more
difficult to remember.
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strength of spontaneous justice inferences was calculated by subtracting scores on
control trials from scores on experimental trials for trials using justice-related cue
words. A regression analysis with all three subscales of the JSS as predictors, and
this measure for spontaneous justice inferences as the criterion, again showed
JSSPerpetrator, Beta = .34, t(90) = 2.61, p \ .05, and JSSVictim, Beta = .25,
t(90) = 2.27, p \ .05, to be significant predictors, whereas JSSObserver was not a
significant predictor, Beta = .032, t(90) = .25, p = .80.
General Discussion
The current findings support and extend earlier research that provided the first
evidence for spontaneous justice inferences (Ham & Van den Bos, 2008). That is,
the current research provides further evidence that people can draw inferences about
the justness of situations spontaneously, using the identical research paradigm to
assess spontaneous justice inferences as earlier research (Ham & Van den Bos,
2008; the probe recognition paradigm) but also using a new research paradigm (the
grid-relearning paradigm). More specifically, in two experiments, using the two
different implicit measurement paradigms, we found evidence that people
spontaneously draw inferences about the justness of events. In Experiments 1 and
2, we found evidence that people draw spontaneous inferences about social justice
when reading a self-relevant situation description of a just or an unjust event. That
is, we found that when people read short situation descriptions that portray just or
unjust events, they spontaneously activate social justice inferences, resulting in
stronger interference effects in a probe-recognition study (Experiment 1) and
stronger facilitation effects in a relearning study (Experiment 2). Because of the
features of the currently used research paradigms described earlier (for further
details, see Carlston & Skowronski 1994; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986; see also De
Houwer & Moors, 2007), we know that spontaneous justice inferences studied here
have been formed in unintentional (indicated by both research paradigms) and
uncontrollable (indicated by the probe recognition paradigm, see also, Bargh, 1994)
ways by our participants, and we can assume that the justice inferences drawn were
activated spontaneously while reading the descriptions (see Uleman, 1999).The
current results provide further evidence that in many justice-relevant situations
people will draw inferences about justice levels of that situation without the
necessity of any intentions to assess justice levels, and without being able to refrain
from doing so. Therefore, this finding presents empirical evidence to the ongoing
debate on the nature of justice and moral judgments mentioned in the introduction
(see, e.g., Haidt, 2001): justice judgments do not necessarily need careful and
intentional reasoning, but can also be made unintentionally. An implication of the
current findings therefore is that it can be expected that people will spontaneously
draw inferences about social justice in justice-relevant situations, also when they are
busy doing other things (e.g., Van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, & Ybema, 2006).
Furthermore, the results presented here suggest that spontaneous justice
inferences should not be equated with spontaneous general evaluation of valence.
That is, both experiments clearly indicated stronger spontaneous justice inferences
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than spontaneous general valence evaluation, indicated by stronger interference
effects for justice-related words than for valence-related words in Experiment 1, and
stronger facilitation effects for justice-related words than for valence-related words
in Experiment 2. Thus, both the experiments show that justice-implying descriptions
influenced activation of justice-related words stronger than activation of valence-
related words. Had spontaneous justice inferences been a process of more general
valence evaluation, we should have found no significant differences between
justice-related and valence-related probes or cues, or would have found the opposite
pattern of results, because, as Pretest 2 indicates, our valence-related words are
evaluated more extreme on a valence dimension than the justice-related words and
both research paradigms are sensitive to detecting both spontaneous justice
inferences as well as spontaneous valence evaluation.7 This last aspect of our
findings suggests that, on the one hand, as Van den Bos et al. (2008) suggest, the
cognitive process of assessing social justice seems to be a process identical in its
characteristics to other higher mental processes, but, on the other hand, it also seems
to constitute an independent higher mental processes that can have unique qualities,
at least in the two experiments presented here.
Another major aim of the current manuscript was to assess the relation between
our measures of spontaneous justice judgments and sensitivity to issues of social
justice. In Experiments 1 and 2, we found that sensitivity for social justice issues
(Schmitt, 1996) predicted the strength of spontaneous justice inferences. More
precisely, the subscales of JSSVictim and JSSPerpetrator predicted the strength of
spontaneous justice inferences, whereas the subscale of JSSObserver did not. This
indicates that the more sensitive people are to experiencing injustice towards oneself
(JSSVictim) and to profiting themselves from unfair events (JSSPerpetrator), the more
strongly they spontaneously drew justice inferences in our studies. Contrastingly,
spontaneous justice inferences remained independent of sensitivity to observing that
others are treated unfairly (JSSObserver). An explanation for this might be that our
stimulus material only used descriptions of justice-relevant situations applied to
participants themselves (as, e.g., ‘‘You made a test of 40 questions. Your grade is
based on 1 of your 40 answers’’) and did not use descriptions of justice-relevant
situations applied to other people. So, interestingly, this suggests that spontaneous
justice inferences about self-involving justice-related situations can be predicted by
specific sensitivity to issues of social justice, namely sensitivity to self-involving
issues (JSSVictim and JSSPerpetrator), and not by sensitivity to other-involving issues
of social justice. Future research may want investigate whether spontaneous justice
inferences about other-involving justice-related situations can be predicted by
sensitivity to other-involving issues of social justice (the JSSObserver subscale). The
current findings corroborate our argument for the idea that frequently assessing
(self-involving) social justice (reflected in high levels of justice sensitivity) will lead
to more spontaneous (self-involving) justice inferences. Thereby, these findings are
7 That is, Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that both research paradigms are sensitive to detection of
spontaneous justice inferences. In addition, as mentioned earlier, findings of Experiment 1 suggest that the
probe recognition paradigm is sensitive to detecting spontaneous valence evaluation, and earlier research
(by Ho, Skowronski, & Carlston; D. Carlston, personal communication, November 11, 2005) successfully
used the relearning paradigm of Experiment 2 to detect spontaneous valence evaluation.
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relevant to recent work by Baumert and Schmitt (2009) that frames justice
sensitivity in terms of the accessibility of justice categories. So, in Experiments 1
and 2 we found evidence for spontaneous inferences about social justice, but no
evidence that unjust-implying descriptions lead to stronger automatic activation of
justice concerns than just-implying descriptions.
Furthermore, the current two studies did also not suggest differences in activation
of just-related (e.g., ‘‘just’’) from unjust-related concepts (e.g., ‘‘unjust’’) dependent
on whether a description implied a just or an unjust event. This latter finding is in
line with the finding that negations of evaluative stimuli (e.g., ‘‘no snakes’’) do not
influence spontaneous evaluative responses to these stimuli (Deutsch, Gawronski, &
Strack, 2006; but see also Mayo, Schul & Burnstein, 2004), even though
spontaneous responses to stimuli that consist of traits versus their antonyms (e.g.,
‘‘cruel’’ vs. ‘‘kind’’) can vary (Todorov & Uleman, 2002). A measure of concept
activation (as the two research paradigms we used in Experiments 1 and 2) might be
very sensitive to activation levels of concepts (represented by words or related
words), but might not be the best paradigm to assess activation differences between
concepts represented by words related to one another. Future research may employ
implicit measurement paradigms that are better suited for these specific questions,
and in addition study possible mediators of the strength of spontaneous justice
inferences.
Recently, Uleman et al. (2008) indicated that spontaneous inferences have been
insufficiently linked to other phenomena and theories. The current research makes
this link in three ways: By integrating the social cognition (including spontaneous
inference literature) and social justice literatures, disentangling spontaneous
inferences from spontaneous general evaluations, and assessing the covariance
between spontaneous justice inferences and sensitivity to justice. Thereby, it adds
important knowledge to the literature on spontaneous inferences.
A final merit of the current research we want to mention is that it provides
methodological tools that can be used in future research to get more fine-grained
insights into the social justice judgment process. That is, we have tailored two
precise research paradigms and ditto stimulus materials especially to assess and test
spontaneous justice inferences.
More broadly, the current findings have important implications for proponents of
models in moral psychology and social justice research that assume either controlled
or spontaneous cognitive processes for making justice judgments or moral
judgments. Because we now have strong and additional evidence that justice
judgments can occur spontaneously, we can conclude that not necessarily are
controlled processes needed for people to come to justice judgments. Therefore, the
current results suggest a disconfirmation of an important assumption of earlier justice
models stating that the justice judgment process constitutes a particularly controlled
process (see, e.g., Jasso, 1999; Sabbagh et al., 1994). Rather, we can conclude that
cognitive reactions to justice-related events probably consist of both spontaneous (as
indicated by the current research) and controlled (as indicated by earlier research)
processes (see, e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and future research could investigate
the relation between these processes. This could lead to the conclusion that, whether
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born-in (De Waal, 2001) or through socialization (see, e.g., Lerner, Miller, &
Holmes, 1976), humans seem to be able to make justice judgments spontaneously.
In sum, the current research teaches us several things about justice inferences: it
provides strong evidence that spontaneous social justice inferences can occur in
multiple research paradigms, these inferences constitute a process separate from
spontaneous general evaluation of valence, and spontaneous justice inferences
covary with individual differences in sensitivity to justice. Also, we now have
available research mechanisms to directly assess these spontaneous justice
inferences.
Thereby, the current research sheds light on the nature of justice inferences. It
suggests that the nature of people’s responses to justice-relevant situations and
events might at least partly be spontaneous and unintentional. So, when assessing
people’s justice-relevant responses, future research should take into account
people’s spontaneous justice inferences. Because reflective cognitions (e.g.,
controlled justice judgments) and implicit cognitions (e.g., spontaneous justice
inferences) relate to behavior differently (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), spontaneous
justice inferences might prove to be important determinants of behavior in crucial
situations. For example, recent research indicates that implicit attitudes about
consumer products are good product choice predictors in situations of high time-
constraint (Friese, Waenke, & Plessner, 2006). Future research might investigate the
relationship between controlled and spontaneous justice inferences and various
kinds of justice-related behavior. Thereby, we would not only uncover more about
the nature of justice inferences, but also about the implications of the (spontaneous,
implicit) nature of justice inferences on human behavior in society, politics,
organizations, and intimate relationships.
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